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Abstract 
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese water sector has undergone an important institutional reform that 
has shifted major responsibilities in irrigation management from the government toward water 
users, who are organized in so-called Water User Associations (WUAs). Such participatory water 
management is not only assumed to increase water use efficiency, but also to stimulate the incomes 
of member households. This study aims to provide empirical evidence of the impact of participatory 
water management on WUA performance and farmer incomes, using data collected for the year 
2007 among 317 households and 35 WUAs in Minle County, Gansu Province. We find that having 
democratically elected leaders has a positive effect on WUA performance, by increasing investment 
levels and improving canal quality. Participation in decision making, however, has a significant 
negative impact on canal quality and does not affect other WUA performance indicators. Two 
aspects of WUA performance, investment levels and financial health, are found to have a positive 
impact on the farm income of member households. Water use per mu, on the other hand, has a 
significant negative impact on farm incomes. We also find evidence that households belonging to 
better performing WUAs increase their farm incomes at the expense of non-farm income. The 
resulting net impact of participatory water management on total household income is not significant 
for the households in our sample.       
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1. Introduction 
 
As the world‟s population and average income level grows, so does its demand for food, and hence 
irrigation water. Questions are arising of whether the world can sustain this increased demand for 
water. Although 75% of the world‟s surface is covered with water, only a small portion of all this 
water is fresh water that is ready to use for agricultural, industrial or domestic purposes. Moreover, 
it is threatened by climate change and pollution, leading different scholars to state that water has 
become a scarce good. This is made all the more pressing by the fact that it is not only the demand 
for irrigation water that is increasing; a continued rise in living standards fuels a global increase in 
demand for domestic and industrial water as well. 
 
Irrigation is vital to maintain global food supplies and thus to keep basic food affordable to the very 
poor (Carruthers et al. 1997). As the cost for creating new supplies – e.g. by building dams and 
other water infrastructure – are increasing, efforts are increasingly directed towards using the water 
that is currently available more efficiently. Policy makers in China, and in many other parts of the 
world, have sought to go beyond technical means of increasing water use efficiency in agriculture. 
The high costs of creating new and improving existing infrastructure has prompted the Chinese 
government to employ other methods to improve water management in regions, particularly in the 
North and Northwest, facing severe water shortages (Nickum 2005; Shalizi 2006). Since the early 
1990s, the Chinese water sector has undergone an important institutional reform that has shifted 
major responsibilities in irrigation management from the government toward water users. Users of 
irrigation water have been organized in so-called Water User Associations (WUAs) in many 
projects (Lin 2003).   
 
China's efforts to implement institutional reforms in order to combat water shortages fit in a wider, 
global trend, in which the issues surrounding water shortages are no longer stated purely as a 
technical problem. It is often realized that it is not just water that needs to be managed; to a very 
large extent, the success of irrigation depends on the management of people. Irrigation depends on 
people, staff, farmers, experts, engineers and other stakeholders, and the relationships among these 
groups to make it work. Subramanian et al. (1997) argue that inefficiencies in irrigation arise due to 
two inherent features: non-excludability and rivalry. Often, in the face of institutions lacking power 
and capabilities to enforce rules, actors appropriate an unfair amount of water at the expense of less 
privileged actors. The classic example of this is over-irrigation by farmers located close to the head 
works of an irrigation system, while farmers downstream are suffering water shortages. These 
factors are exacerbated by the complexities in water management, which means that planners have 
to make decisions on the basis of incomplete information. Local actors are assumed to have the 
most complete information. Including them explicitly in the decision making process ensures that 
issues such as poverty, food security, and public health problems, which are frequently used to 
motivate public intervention in water services, are addressed as effectively as possible 
(Subramanian et al. 1997).  
 
WUAs are one of the most prominent types of institutional arrangements proposed to involve water 
users in the decision making and planning associated with irrigation. The discovery of farmer 
managed irrigation systems in the 1970s (such as the Subaks in Bali) led to the realization that 
irrigation was not necessarily a task for large scale bureaucracies run by the state. Becker & Ostrom 
(1995) propose to treat water as a common pool resource, best managed by the users themselves. 
Water users have a greater incentive than state bureaucracies to ensure that management is done in 
an adequate way. However, the large scale of many irrigation schemes makes some state 
involvement necessary. Sub-divisions of large-scale schemes are often turned over to farmers, while 
the government bureaucracy remains responsible for trunk infrastructure (Dinar et al. 1997). 
 
The impact of the creation of WUAs on farmer incomes remains unclear. Participative institutions 
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are expected to perform better in irrigation water management than state-run bureaucracies, and 
improved irrigation performance has been shown to increase farmer incomes (Rosegrant & Shetty 
1994). But empirical evidence for the assumed positive impact of participatory water management 
on farmer incomes is hard to find. This is mainly due to the fact that water sector reform is often 
accompanied by other interventions, such as improvements in infrastructure, which makes it 
difficult to obtain estimates of their separate impacts. 
 
This study aims to provide empirical evidence of the impact of participatory water management on 
farmer incomes. To this end, we will firstly examine to what extent participatory water management 
affects WUA performance, and secondly investigate the impact of WUA performance on the (farm 
and off-farm) incomes of households that participate in WUAs. The data for the analysis was 
obtained from of a survey performed among 317 households and 35 WUAs in Minle County, Gansu 
Province in Northwest China. 
 
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background. In section 3 the research setting and the dataset used for the econometric analysis are 
discussed. In section 4 the specification of the regression equations and the results of the empirical 
analysis are presented, while section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
The institutional economics of irrigation 
The 20
th
 century has seen a huge increase in the size of irrigated land, from 48 million hectares in 
the year 1900 to 240 million hectares at the end of the century (Vermillion 2004). This increase has 
largely been made possible by government investments. Due to the sheer costs of investments in 
irrigation systems, most farmers are not able to finance such investments themselves. And even if 
they can, pervasive externalities (both positive and negative) associated with irrigation make 
claiming the benefits impossible. This has led to a situation where state-led bureaucracies have 
become responsible for the management of irrigation water. Gaining economic returns from these 
investments often was not a priority. Rather, irrigation was seen as a form of “social welfare” 
(Johnson 1995). However, the burdens associated with maintaining large-scale irrigation systems 
have led states facing increasing fiscal problems which led them to rethink their responsibilities in 
water management (Vermillion 2004).  
 
A second impetus for institutional reform has been the realization that water users are in a better 
position to manage their water than large bureaucracies are. Farmers‟ lack of a sense of ownership 
has caused a low willingness to pay for irrigation services. This in turn has led to poor service 
provision, further decreasing farmers‟ willingness to pay. In many cases this vicious cycle has led to 
deteriorating infrastructure. 
 
In order to address both financial problems and poor service provision, farmers have been given a 
greater role in irrigation management. It is realized that user organizations can be an effective way 
to manage common pool resources (Becker & Ostrom 1995). WUAs have therefore been 
implemented in an increasing number of countries.  
 
WUAs provide a platform to co-ordinate the collective action required for successful irrigation, and 
hence lower the transaction costs as compared to state bureaucracies (Subramanian et al. 1997). 
Young (1986) defines transaction costs as “the resources required to establish, operate, and enforce 
a system to govern resource allocation.” Transaction costs therefore both include ex-ante and ex-
post costs. Ex-ante, farmers have better information with respect to local water requirements than 
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large bureaucracies have. So when setting rotation schedules, farmers can allocate the water to those 
areas that need water the most. Ex-post, it is easier for farmers to ensure that the actual allocation is 
done in the agreed way. While it is hard for farmers to monitor a large bureaucracy, the actions of 
their neighbours are relatively easy to observe. In order for this collective action to work at its best, 
solid conflict resolution mechanisms are essential (see e.g. Becker & Ostrom 1995; Dinar et al. 
1997; Saleth & Dinar 1999a; Vermillion 2004). 
 
Transferring responsibilities for irrigation management from the state to farmers entails more than a 
shift in the burdens associated with the operation and management of systems. It affects a greater 
sense of ownership by farmers. This sense of ownership is quite significant, due to the change in 
incentives it implies. State management has been characterized by an emphasis on creation of new 
projects, rather than the management of existing ones. Farmers, on the other hand care more for the 
existing schemes (which serve them) and will aim to improve infrastructure and service quality (Lin 
2003; Nickum 2005; Johnson 1995).  
 
While, theoretically, WUAs should both reduce government spending and increase efficiency, 
evidence of the performance impacts of WUAs is fragmentary (Meinzen-Dick 1997). Some authors 
point to perceived gains in service quality, area irrigated, equity and efficiency (Subramanian et al. 
1997; Lin 2003). This generally comes at an increased price to farmers: the state retracts most 
subsidies, leaving farmers to pay for the provision of services (Meinzen-Dick 1997b; Vermillion 
1997; Johnson 1995). The effect on equity is not automatically positive. It might well be the case 
that richer farmers have more leverage to influence decisions in WUAs to their advantage than poor 
farmers have (Van Koppen et al. 2002). It is unclear what the net effect of greater farmer 
participation is, but it may be expected that the benefits of improved performance outweigh 
increased costs to farmers. 
Measuring WUA performance 
In order to measure the performance of WUAs, it is first needed to define performance. A ready-to-
use definition is proposed by Saleth & Dinar (1999). They distinguish between four kinds of 
performance: 
 
 The physical performance of the water sector is evaluated in terms of the following 
aspects: 
a) Demand-supply gap, 
b) Physical health of water infrastructure, 
c) Conflict resolution efficiency (low-cost, including time), and 
d) Smoothness of water transfers across sectors/regions/users. 
 
 The financial  performance of the water sector is evaluated in terms of the following 
aspects: 
a) Investment gap (actual vs. required) and 
b) Financial gap (expenditure vs. cost recovery). 
 
 The economic efficiency of the water sector is evaluated in terms of the following aspects: 
a) Pricing gap (water prices vs. supply cost) and 
b) Incentive gap (water prices vs. scarcity value of water). 
 
 And, finally, the equity performance of the water sector is evaluated in terms of the 
following aspects: 
a) Equity between regions, 
b) Equity between sectors, and 
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c) Equity between groups. 
 
 
3. Description of research area and data set 
 
The information needed for this study was collected as part of a household and WUA survey on 
water resources, water policies, market development and institutional change, carried out in May 
2008 in Minle County, Zhangye City, Gansu province. Zhangye City is located in the upper to 
middle reaches of the Heihe river basin. The Heihe river flows northwards from the Qilian 
mountains in Qinghai Province towards the Juyanhai lake in Inner Mongolia. The river has a 
relatively high runoff (Li et al. 2001). The water from the river turns the Hexi corridor –where the 
Silk Road passed between the Gobi desert and the Qilian Mountains– into a patchwork of fertile 
oases, allowing the cultivation of crops and turning an area that would otherwise be dry and barren 
into one of China‟s major commodity grain producing (Zhang 2007). Major crops produced in the 
area are wheat, barley, maize and potatoes. However, due to water over-extraction in Zhangye City, 
the Heihe river failed to reach the Juyanhai lake in dry years such as 1992, leading to desertification 
(Zhang 2007). 
 
In early 2002, the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) initiated a pilot project called „Building a 
Water-saving Society in Zhangye City‟, the first project of its kind in the country. The project aims 
to reduce the water use in Zhangye City through a combination of measures to stimulate non-
agricultural sectors, investments in irrigation infrastructure, institutional innovations and an 
innovative system of water resources property rights allocation and trading. As a result of the 
measures that were taken, the water of the Heihe river more often reaches the Juyanhai lake in 
recent years. The lake is not drying up anymore since August 2004 and the ecosystem of the lake is 
recovering.  
 
Minle County itself is spread between the foothills of the Qilian Mountains and the lower lying 
Hexi corridor. Its location results in different agro-ecological conditions: At the higher elevations, 
rainfall is relatively abundant, while at the lower altitudes it is almost zero. For water management, 
three zones are recognized, each with its own water requirements: Zone 3 is the highest zone and 
covers altitudes between 2,200 and 2,600 meters above sea level. Large parts of this zone are 
rainfed, while irrigated land mostly receives one flooding with a standard water allocation of 72 – 
74 m
3
/mu. Zones 2 and 1 consist almost entirely of irrigated land. Zone 2 is located between 2,000 
and 2,200 meters and has a standard water allocation of 74 - 76 m
3
/mu, with one or two floodings 
per year. Zone 1 is the lowest zone, between 1,600 and 2,000 meters. Irrigated land in this driest 
part of the county receives two or three floodings per year, with a standard allocation of 76 - 78 
m
3
/mu.  
 
A Water Management Bureau (WMB) serves the entire Minle County. It is in charge of managing 
the reservoirs and providing water to its irrigation areas. The provision of water is carried out taking 
into account a sectoral priority: 1. Drinking water (requiring about 15% of the total water in Minle 
County), 2. Agriculture (75%) and 3. Industry (10%). There are 7 reservoirs, serving 5 irrigation 
areas. Each of the latter has its own exclusive reservoirs, and its Irrigation Area Bureau (IAB) is 
responsible for the provision of water to the villages within its own district. Irrigation is carried out 
by flooding groups of adjacent farmlands at a time, organized from lowest to highest altitudes 
Standard water quantities per mu are assigned for each flooding, but these quantities are only 
realized in years of abundant rainfall. Water is allocated according to a quota system based on the 
size of the so-called water use rights (WUR) land of the farmers. Not all the irrigated land is 
classified as WUR land. Its size depends on the labor provided by a village to the construction of 
the reservoir and other factors.  
6 
 
 
The household survey was undertaken in May 2008 by staff from the Gansu Academy of Social 
Sciences in Lanzhou and Nanjing Agricultural University. The collected data refer to the year 2007. 
To ensure that all townships and zones would be properly represented in the survey, the sample was 
stratified into its ten townships. Next, 10% of the villages in each stratum were randomly selected. 
Eight townships are entirely located inside one of the three zones. The other two townships were 
divided into two sub-stratums (one for each zone) and 10% of the villages were randomly selected 
in each. This ensures that the differences in water allocations and agricultural conditions between 
the three zones are also adequately reflected in the sample. Finally, in each of the 21 selected 
villages, 15 households were randomly selected to be interviewed.
1
 The interviewee was the 
household head or another household member capable of giving the relevant information. If none of 
these persons was found, the household was dropped and replaced by the next one in the list of 
random numbers. For the purpose of this study, all households that had missing data on one or more 
variables used in the empirical analysis were excluded. This gave us a dataset containing 212 
observations (households). WUA representatives were interviewed in the same 21 villages and in 14 
additional, randomly selected, villages, giving a WUA sample size of 35.  
 
 
4. Methods and results 
 
The research consists of two steps. In the first step, we examine what factors determine WUA 
performance. To this end a regression analysis is performed. It is hypothesized that one of the main 
determinants of performance is the degree to which WUAs allow their members to participate in 
decision making. Some factors are not homogeneous across the research area: some villages are 
located further away from main canals than others, some villages have good political connections 
because high-level leaders were born there, and so on. We control for such factors in our regression 
analysis. The second step in the research is to examine the impact of WUA performance on rural 
incomes. Both on-farm and off-farm income is analyzed, as WUA management might affect labor 
requirements for irrigation and thus have an effect on both types of income. Apart from WUA 
performance (as discussed above), a set of “traditional” determinants of income, sub-divided into 
farm and village characteristics, will be used as explanatory variables. We will discuss the methods 
applied and the results obtained in each step in the next twosub-sections.  
4.1 WUA performance 
 
No indicators of economic efficiency and equity performance (see section 2 above) are available in 
the data set. The variation in these indicators within Minle County, however, is likely to be small. 
Economic efficiency depends on the allocation vis-à-vis other sectors. This can reasonably assumed 
to be equal across the county as the policies defining this type of efficiency are set at county-level 
by the water management bureau. For similar reasons conflict resolution and smoothness of 
transfers have been left out of the analysis. As for equity, the main concern in irrigation in this 
respect is the distribution of water over head-enders and tail-enders. In Minle County most farmers 
have plots both at the head-end of the canal and at the tail-end. So at WUA level, equity is not a 
major concern. This leaves two measures for physical performance, and two for financial 
performance.  
 
The following equation is used for estimating the impact of WUA characteristics on its 
performance:  
WP = c + βwc‟WC + βvc‟VC  
                                                 
1
 In the first two villages, 16 households were interviewed. 
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Where:  
WP is a vector of WUA performance indicators; 
WC and VC are matrices of WUA and Village Characteristics respectively; 
βwc and βvc are vectors of the coefficients to be estimated. 
 
Below we discuss in more detail the indicators of WUA performance and the variables representing 
WUA characteristics and village characteristics that are included in the analysis.  
 
WUA performance indicators 
In order to measure WUA performance, five indicators have been used. These include both physical 
(the amount of water supplied per mu, and the quality of secondary canals and tertiary canals) and 
financial indicators (investments density, and financial ratio). 
 
Demand-supply gap: Water supply-demand ratio 
Our data set has information on the amount of water that was supplied to the WUA in 2007. We use 
the standard water allocation for the agro-ecological zone in which the WUA is located as the 
indicator of water demand. A gap between supply and demand would imply that the value for the 
indicator can assume both positive and negative values. However, as will be discussed below, the 
household level analysis requires natural logs to be taken of all indicators. As this is impossible for 
negative values, a ratio has been chosen, where the supply (in cubic meters per mu) has been 
divided by the demand. One complicating factor in this is that there are multiple rounds of 
irrigation, up to four in the research year, but not all these rounds were used by the WUAs. This 
depends on local conditions, and crop choices. Therefore an average over all the cycles used by the 
WUA has been used. There are also rounds of irrigation after the growing season, but as the effects 
of these rounds on crop production are much smaller than those of the regular rounds, these have 
been left out. 
 
Physical health: Secondary and tertiary canal quality 
A canal system consists of several levels of canals. Primary canals feed water from the reservoir to 
secondary canals, which branch off these main canals. Secondary canals feed to their branches, 
which are tertiary canals, and so on. Farmers‟ fields are often located at small, quaternary canals. 
WUAs have responsibility for the quality the secondary and tertiary canals in their village, the 
quaternary canals are the responsibility of the farmer group with land at that canal. So only the 
secondary and tertiary canals will be examined here. They will be examined separately, as the health 
of the canals at different levels may not have the same impact: the water to multiple tertiary canals 
flow through the same secondary canal. Four indicators of quality can be distinguished: canals with 
no lining, canals lined with stones, canals lined with stones and concrete, and canals lined entirely 
with concrete. Concrete canals are the smoothest, and so deliver the water quickest from one end of 
the canal to the other, resulting in the smallest conveyance losses. In order to quantify quality for 
the purposes of this research, the ratio of canals treated with concrete is used. The data on this has 
been provided by WUA representatives. 
 
Investment gap: Investment Density 
As the amount of money invested in canal maintenance and improvement depends on the length of 
the canals in a WUA, the amount of investment in canals in 2007 is divided by the total length of 
the canals in a village. Investments include farmer‟s labour contribution as well as financial 
contributions by the WUA. Farmers‟ labour has been valued at the average wage in the county. 
 
Financial gap: Financial ratio 
The financial gap is obtained by subtracting the total expenditures of the WUA in 2007 from the 
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total revenues in the same year. Some WUAs have larger budgets than others, simply because they 
have more members to contribute water fees. In order to correct for this, the resulting gap has been 
expressed as a share of the total WUA revenues. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of WUA performance indicators  
 
Indicator Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Investment Density 103 224 0.00 907 
Secondary Canal Quality 0.73 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Tertiary Canal Quality 0.40 0.44 0.00 1 
Water supply-demand ratio 2.33 1.12 0.71 5.56 
Finance Ratio 1.66 2.43 -0.15 10 
 
Descriptive statistics of the performance indicators are presented in Table 1. One of the striking 
features is that the WUAs provided more than twice the standard amount of water (average water 
supply-demand ratio equals 2.33). This is because 2007 was characterized by abundant rainfall, and 
hence there was sufficient water to supply more than the standard amounts. Still, some WUAs did 
not achieve this, resulting in a minimum value smaller than one (i.e. 0.71). WUA revenues on 
average exceeded expenditures in 2007, as can be seen from the positive average value for the 
finance ratio, but some WUAs did make a loss (minimum value is -0.15). The finding that 
secondary canal quality is higher than tertiary canal quality makes sense, as larger amounts of water 
flow through the secondary level.  
 
WUA Characteristics 
It has been discussed above that participative institutions are widely believed to perform better than 
non-participative ones. This hypothesis will be tested in this research by including variables in the 
WUA-level regression that reflect how participative the WUA is.  
 
Democratic elections 
The first such variable is whether or not the WUA leader was elected democratically. In the majority 
of the cases, the village leader acts as the WUA leader. Only in two villages this is not the case. 
Remarkably, these two WUA leaders were among those not appointed in democratic ways (i.e. not 
elected by member households or their representatives). Of the total sample of 35 WUAs, 12 
leaders were appointed by democratic means. 
 
Decision making participation 
The process by which the association leader is elected is important, but there are many decisions to 
be taken after a leader is elected. These operational decisions can be made in a participative way, or 
not. Most studies seem content with a view of participation as a dichotomous variable: irrigation is 
done either participative or not. From there these studies go on to assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of participation (Lin 2002; Subramanian et al. 1997; Vermillion 1997). In Minle 
County, this dichotomous distinction is inappropriate: some WUAs devolve many decisions to their 
members, some only give them indirect control over a number of decisions, while still others might 
not give their members any say. The data set used for this research contains information on how 
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seven types of decisions – ranging from irrigation order, to the assigning of guards to oversee water 
allocation – are taken. Nine ways of taking decisions were identified in the research. Decisions can 
be taken by: 
1. WUA director; 
2. WUA director, approval of general meeting of all WUA households needed; 
3. WUA director, approval of meeting of representatives of WUA households needed; 
4. General meeting of all WUA households;  
5. Meeting of representatives of WUA households; 
6. User groups in the WUA; 
7. Individual households; 
8. Water Management Bureau;  
9. Party of the village. 
 
Any of these that give at least some voice to water users have been considered participative for the 
purposes of this study. These include numbers 2 – 7 in the list above. The non-participation 
category also includes non-response by the WUA.  
 
Table 1: Number of WUAs that take participatorydecisions  
Decision Participatory Non-participatory 
Irrigation order 27 8 
Water price 11 24 
Volunteer labor 15 20 
Tertiary canal maintenance 27 8 
Rules regarding groundwater use 24 11 
Assignment of guards overseeing 
water the water allocation process 8 27 
Sanctions against members 
breaking the rules 26 9 
 
Table 2 provides the number of WUAs that take participatory decisions for each type of decision 
considered in the research. Participation by WUA members is highest for decisions on irrigation 
order, canal maintenance, groundwater use and sanctions against members. Member households 
have much less impact on water pricing, „voluntary‟ labor contributions and the assignments of 
guards.  
 
The indicator for participation that is used in the regression is a count measure indicating for each 
WUA how many decisions are taken participatory. It is expected that high values for this indicator 
lead to a better performance of WUAs.  
 
Other characteristics 
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Other WUA characteristics that serve as explanatory variables of WUA performance in the 
regression analysis include characteristics of the leader (e.g. age and education), the number of 
farmer groups in a WUA and the number of years that have passed since the establishment of the 
association.  
Village Characteristics 
In order to control for factors that lie outside WUA control, a number of variables are included. 
Regional leaders might pass extra resources to the village in which they were born. In order to 
account for this a dummy variable indicating whether a leader was born in the village is included. 
Also, a village close to the county capital might be advantaged, because it is more visible to high 
officials from the water management bureau. The agro-ecological zone (dry, medium, or wet) in 
which the village is located might affect water management, as might the distance between the 
village and the main canal. Table 3 lists all these variables and the ones discussed above, provides 
brief summaries of how they are measured, and shows the expected affects for each of the 
explanatory variables. 
 
Table 3: Variables included in WUA performance regression 
Variable Type Definition Expected 
Effect 
Dependent Variables 
Investment Density Continuous Money spent maintenance, construction, and 
upgrading of canals by farmers and government 
divided by total length of secondary canals plus 
tertiary canals 
 
Secondary canal quality Continuous Ratio of improved canals  
Tertiary canal quality Continuous See secondary canal quality  
Amount of water per 
Mu 
Continuous The amount of water delivered per mu of 
agricultural land, per rotation, divided by the 
standard amount of the agro-ecological zone  
 
Financial Ratio Continuous (Total income – total expenditure)/total income 
(All in RMB) 
 
WUA Characteristics 
Leader Age Continuous Age in years of the WUA leader + 
Leader Education Continuous Years of education of the leader + 
Decision-making 
Participation 
Discrete Number of decisions taken in a participative way + 
Democratically elected 
leader 
Dummy Democratically elected leader=1, otherwise 0 + 
WUA age Continuous Number of years since the establishment of the 
WUA 
+ 
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WUA size Continuous Number of farmer groups in the WUA ? 
Village Characteristics 
Leader born Dummy 1 = Important regional leader was born in the 
village 
+ 
Distance from main 
canal 
Continuous Number of meters from main canal to village - 
Distance from county 
capital 
Continuous Number of km from village to the county capital, 
Hongshui 
- 
Zone 2 Dummy 1 = The village is located in the middle zone ? 
Zone3 Dummy 1 = The village is located in the highest (and 
wettest) zone 
? 
 
Results 
The results of the regression analysis are summarized in Table 4. The variables listed in the top row 
are the independent variables, i.e. the WUA performance indicators.   
 
 
Table 2: Results of village level regression analysis 
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WUA Characteristics
-3,02  -0,11 ** 0,00  -0,04  -0,11  
-(,1) -(2,73) (,14) -(,26) -(,54)
277,18 ** 0,23 * 0,08  -0,61  -1,06  
(2,19) (1,84) (,42) -(,89) -(1,61)
Leader Age 3,94  0,00  0,00  -0,02  0,02  
(,74) -(,54) -(,04) -(,49) (,26)
Leader Education 7,13  0,03  0,04 * -0,02  -0,14  
(,51) (1,36) (1,8) -(,23) -(,87)
WUA Age 12,94  0,01  0,08 ** 0,11  -0,10  
(,92) (,57) (2,26) (,88) -(,5)
WUA Size -6,35  0,00  0,01  0,02  0,01  
-(,79) (,44) (,36) (,5) (,11)
Village Characteris tics
Leader Born 170,64  0,43 *** 0,09  0,84  -1,56  
(1,38) (4,2) (,37) (1,15) -(1,13)
-2,13  0,00 ** 0,00  0,03 *** 0,02 **
-(1,66) -(2,8) (,59) (3,94) (2,72)
-2,11  0,00  0,00  0,00  -0,06  
-(,56) -(1,01) (,24) -(,11) -(1,44)
Zone 2 39,53  -0,16  -0,11  0,93  0,39  
(,4) -(1,28) -(,42) (1,67) (,4)
Zone 3 -58,94  -0,61 *** -0,38  1,43  0,48  
-(,55) -(3,51) -(1,25) (1,55) (,29)
Regress ion Statis tics
0,37 0,63 0,44 0,50 0,26
n 35 30 33 35 35
Investment  
Density
Secondary 
Canal 
Quality
T ert iary 
Canal 
Quality
Water Per 
mu
Finance 
Rat io
Decision 
Participation
Democratic 
Elections
Distance Main 
Canal
Distance County 
Capital
R2
 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level, *** at the 1%-level 
 
 
The two variables chosen to represent participation – democratically elected leaders and decision-
making participation – indeed seem to have a significant impact on WUA performance. However, 
this impact is not uniformly positive. While democratically elected leaders seem to have a positive 
impact on performance (in terms of secondary canal quality and investment density), this is not true 
for increased decision making participation (which has a negative correlation with secondary canal 
quality). Two explanations for this last effect can be put forward: firstly, farmers are unwilling to 
invest in secondary canals, because benefits of good-quality canals cannot be fully captured by the 
individual farmers. This would lead participative institutions to under-invest, as each farmer would 
rather have the others invest. A second explanation would be more positive about the attitudes of the 
farmers towards collective action: in villages with poor quality canals, farmers are in a stronger 
position to demand more say in the decisions taken. We would be seeing reversed causality here. 
The fact that decision making participation does not have a significant negative impact on 
investment might support this position. However, this argument does reveal one problematic aspect 
of canal quality as an indicator for WUA performance. Canals predate the establishment of water 
user associations in the research area. As such, canal quality depends to a large extent on past 
investments. This would suggest that WUA characteristics are of limited importance to the physical 
health of the infrastructure.  
 
Of the WUA characteristics not directly related to participation, both leader education and WUA 
age have an effect on tertiary canal quality. Especially the fact that WUA age positively affects 
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performance is an indication that the reforms initiated in Minle are beneficial, and that some of the 
benefits take some time to materialize.   
 
When considering the village characteristics – which were added to the regressions as controls – 
three variables are found to have a significant effect on performance. A regional leader being born 
in the village has a positive effect on secondary canal quality. This is a possible indication for 
nepotism. Secondly, the distance from the main canal matters for the secondary canal quality, 
amount of water delivered and the financial situation of the WUA. That secondary canal quality is 
lower, which can be explained by the fact that the canals are longer, and thus more costly to 
upgrade. The fact that villages located far away from the main canal are able to supply more water 
than those close to the canals is explained by the way the variables are defined. The amount of 
water supplied is the amount the WUA obtains from the WMB, at the branch of the secondary canal 
from the primary canal. As the WMB compensates the WUA for conveyance losses in the stretch 
between the primary canal and the village, villages located far from the canal receive more water 
without having to closely manage their water. The effect on financial situation is more mysterious. 
One would expect such an effect to be negative, if anything, due to the extra expenses more canals 
bring with them. Finally the zone in which the village is located matters for canal quality. 
 
14 
 
4.2 Farmers’ income 
Three reduced form equations will be estimated in order to examine the importance of WUA 
performance relative to the other determinants of farm income, off-farm income and total income. 
The variables for WUA performance used in the equations are the same as the dependent variables 
in the first stage. However, for the set of regressions that make up the second stage of the research, 
they will serve as independent variables. Added to this are three other types of variables thought to 
have an impact on household income: household characteristics – covering aspects of the household 
members, such as age and education, farm characteristics – which cover aspects such as land 
holdings and soil fertility, and village characteristics – as defined above.  
 
The resulting set of equations is: 
 
Y = c + βhc‟HC + βfc‟FC + βvc‟VC + βwp‟WP  
 
Where:  
Y is a vector of income: On-farm, off-farm and total. 
HC, FC and VC are matrices of household, farm and village characteristics respectively; 
WP is a matrix of WUA performance indicators; 
β-terms are matrices of the parameters to be estimated. 
 
Income consists of two components: on-farm and off-farm income. The number of household in the 
sample that have no or negative income from farming is so small as to be negligible (n=16). Things 
are different for off-farm income. Not every household in the sample is engaged in the off-farm 
labor market. And no household make a loss at their off-farm activities. Only for the households 
that do engage in the labor market have effects been estimated, using a truncated regression. 
 
To both make regression estimations consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
mitigate the effects of potential outliers, the natural logs of the variables on both sides of the 
equation will be taken. 
Income measures 
Even though most of the households in the research area can be typified as farm households, many 
also engage in income generating activities that are not directly related to farming activities in the 
region. As Table 5 indicates, a significant portion of the income in Minle County is derived from 
off-farm sources. While irrigation management is likely to affect farming income, it could also 
indirectly affect off-farm income. Improved irrigation canals could, for example, lead to lower labor 
requirements for irrigation, and thus free up labor for off-farm activities. These two forms of 
income are therefore both analyzed.  
 
Table 3: Mean Incomes in Minle County 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cropping Income 9018 11138 -5804 96904 
Off-farm Income 8310 15739 0 210000 
 
For farm income, only cropping income has been considered. While there is some livestock raising, 
this is likely to be affected differently by irrigation than cropping. Livestock is more dependent on 
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large areas of unirrigated land, and thus of less interest here. The produce used for own 
consumption has been valued at market prices and added to income. 
 
Off-farm income comprises three sources: labor or business outside the farm (but in the region), 
income from migrant labor – many women go to Xinjiang in the far west of China to pick cotton 
every year – and remittances from family members living elsewhere in China. 
 
Table 4: Variable specification for the household level regression 
Variable Type Definition Expected 
Effect 
Dependent Variables 
Farming Income Natural log Income generated from cropping  
Off-farm Income Natural log Income generated from off-farm activities  
Total Income Natural log Off-farm plus farm income  
Household Characteristics 
Labor Natural log Number of persons in the household + 
Gender Ratio Ratio of men in the household + 
Age1 Ratio Ratio of household members between the age of 
16-55 
+ 
Age2 Ratio Ratio of household members aged over 55 + 
Education Head Natural log Years of education of the head of the household + 
Age head Natural log Age of the head of the household + 
Farm Characteristics 
Farm Size Natural log The area in mu planted with crops + 
Irrigation Status Ratio Ratio of land irrigated + 
Slope Ratio Ratio of land on slope - 
Fertility Continuous Average fertility of the land: 3 means bad quality, 
1 means good. 
+ 
 
Household Characteristics 
The composition of the household matters greatly to the ability of the household to generate an 
income. Aspects that are included are: the total members in the family, the ratio of men to women, 
and the age of the household members. To account for the farming ability of the household, the age 
and education of the household head have been included. 
 
Table 5: Results of household level regression analysis 
16 
 
Farm Income T otal Income
Household Charactherist ics
Labour -0,04  0,99 *** 0,35 **
-(,29) (2,84) (2,1)
Gender -0,09  -0,02  0,23  
-(,3) -(,04) (,6)
Age1 -0,02  0,91 ** 0,26  
-(,06) (2,) (,9)
Age2 0,01  -0,02  0,04  
(,03) -(,04) (,12)
Age Head 0,00  0,00  0,00  
(,19) -(,11) (,47)
Education Head 0,01  0,02  0,02  
(,44) (1,06) (1,24)
Farm Charact erist ics
Land 1,07 *** -0,21  0,58 ***
(12,78) -(1,26) (4,82)
Irrigation Status 0,12 ** -0,31  0,10  
(2,52) -(,98) (,93)
Slope -0,14  -0,52  -0,15  
-(,88) -(1,51) -(1,)
Fertility 0,05  0,12  0,12  
(,59) (,94) (1,64)
Capital 0,05 ** 0,05  0,03  
(2,21) (,98) (1,04)
Village Charact erist ics
-0,06 *** 0,00  -0,05  
-(2,91) -(,06) -(1,58)
0,00  0,03  0,00  
-(,14) (,81) -(,13)
Zone2 0,15  0,66 *** 0,30 **
(1,14) (3,02) (2,07)
Zone3 0,38 ** 0,11  0,20  
(2,21) (,36) (1,06)
WUA Performance
Water Per mu -0,28 *** 0,34  -0,01  
-(2,77) (1,49) -(,07)
0,03 * -0,08 ** 0,00  
(1,95) -(2,19) -(,14)
-0,18  -0,53 * -0,23  
-(1,27) -(1,87) -(1,44)
0,11  -0,40  -0,09  
(,72) -(1,34) -(,46)
Finance Ratio 0,05 ** 0,01  0,04 *
(2,28) (,24) (1,81)
Constant Term 5,85 *** 6,55 *** 6,59 ***
(12,22) (6,37) (8,89)
Regression St at ist ics
0,54 0,10 0,31
n 301 258 312
Off-Farm 
Income
Distance county 
capital
Distance main 
canal
Investment 
Density
Secondary Canal 
Quality
Tertiary Canal 
Quality
R2
 
Note: T-values are given in parentheses. * Indicates a 
variable significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% and *** 
at the 1% level. 
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Farm Characteristics 
Not only the demographic characteristics of the household members matter, their assets also need to 
be taken into account, which are grouped under the header of farm characteristics here. The amount 
of land in mu, how much of their land is sloped, the fertility of the land, the irrigation status of the 
land, the amount of capital and livestock are all included. 
Results 
Judging from Table 7, the main determinants of income seem clear, and are as expected: more land, 
capital, and irrigation rights lead to more farm income, while labor is the main determinant of off-
farm income.  
 
As for WUA Performance: the indicators for investment and financial performance have a positive 
impact on income. However, not all indicators were found to have a positive effect: no impact of 
canal quality was observed. The amount of water provided per mu even carries a negative sign. It is 
possible that this effect is due to the fact that water allocation is often intended to compensate for 
adversarial circumstances. In drier, riskier areas, more water per mu is provided. In villages that are 
located farther from main canals, canal quality is often higher (see table 4).   
 
As for off-farm income, the indicators for investment and secondary canal quality are associated 
with negative coefficients. This could indicate that farm households in better performing 
associations are willing to rely more on their farming activities, and thus seek less off-farm 
employment. In such a case one would expect farm income to be higher, after all, the household 
would only shift away labor from off-farm activities in favor of farm activities if it were 
compensated by means of extra income. As observed above there is some evidence for this effect of 
WUA performance on farm income. 
 
As for the impact on total income (off-farm and on-farm combined), very little positive impact of 
the WUA performance indicator remains visible. This might be due to the fact that all data for the 
research comes from a wet year. The direct benefits from improved WUA performance, more water 
that is timed better, are not very large: after all there is more than enough water to make up for 
conveyance losses in poorly maintained canals. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study provides empirical evidence of the impact of participatory water management on farmer 
incomes in Minle County, Gansu province, China. To this end, we will firstly examine to what 
extent participatory water management affects WUA performance. It is a widely held believe that 
the level of user participation is a key determinant of performance. Our results do not 
unambiguously support this position. We found that increasing participation by having 
democratically elected leaders has a positive effect on WUA performance, by increasing 
investments and improving canal quality. However, more direct decision making participation did 
not show a positive effect on WUA performance. Apart from participation, other important factors 
were identified as determinants of WUA performance, such as agro-ecological location or being the 
home village of an important regional leader. This might be taken to imply that increasing 
participation is not the panacea it is often claimed to be. However, the clear positive effect of 
democratic elections demonstrates the potential of holding management accountable to association 
members. The fact that apart from increasing participation, being a home village of a regional 
leader leads to better water management performance, does not demonstrate the limitations of 
participation. It demonstrates that leaders at higher levels of water management should also be 
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made more accountable. The fact that older WUAs have better tertiary canals demonstrates that the 
reforms have not had their full effect in all villages yet, and that improvements are to be expected 
even without further reform.  
 
Secondly, we investigated the impact of WUA performance on the (farm and off-farm) incomes of 
households that participate in WUAs. We found a positive impact of some indicators of WUA 
performance (financial health of the WUA and investment density) on household farm income, but 
also a negative impact of another: the amount of water supplied per mu. This negative impact 
probably has more to do with compensating for harsh circumstances than with overuse of water. 
Although WUA performance is found to have a positive impact on cropping income, its 
performance is found to be negatively affect off-farm income. This is explained by the fact that 
increased WUA performance leads to higher farm productivity, and thus forms a disincentive for 
engaging in off-farm employment. One the whole, one would then expect WUA performance to 
have a positive impact on the combination of off-farm and cropping income. This effect was not 
found. This is probably related to the fact that the data used for this study were collected for a year 
(2007) which happened to be characterized by abundant rainfall. In such circumstances a well 
functioning irrigation sector is of less importance. The more abundant the water, the less important 
it is to economize on it.  
 
The results presented in this paper provide some limited evidence that increasing participation has a 
positive impact on WUA performance, which in turn has a positive impact on income from farming. 
This implies that increasing participation is a strategy to not only limit government outlays on water 
management and to conserve water resources; it also has value as a strategy to increase farm 
incomes. The small sample size at the WUA level (n=35), and the limited scope of this research 
(one growing season in one county in China), however, prevent grand conclusions from being 
drawn from this research. More empirical research, on a larger number of WUAs is a larger number 
of counties, is needed to check the robustness of our findings. 
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